圖書目錄
1. Introduction / 1
1. 1 Motivations for the study / 1
1. 1. 1 Agency conflicts in corporations / 1
1. 1. 2 Corporate governance devices / 3
1. 1. 3 Agency conflicts and corporate governance structures in China / 6
1. 2 Objectives of the study / 11
1. 3 Methodology / 14
1. 4 Organization of the book / 16
2. Literature review of corporate governance in China / 17
2. 1 Ownership structure / 17
2. 2 Board of directors / 20
2. 3 CEO duality, CEO compensation, and CEO turnover / 21
2. 4 External governance mechanisms / 24
2. 4. 1 Takeover market / 24
2. 4. 2 Product market competition / 25
2. 4. 3 Legal infrastructure / 25
2. 4. 4 Bank monitoring / 26
2. 5 Summary of the literature review and research questions / 27
3. Corporate governance and firm value during the global financial crisis: Evidence from China / 29
3. 1 Introduction / 29
3. 2 Hypotheses / 33
3. 3 Sample selection and data / 37
3. 4 Empirical analyses / 43
3. 4. 1 Univariate analyses / 43
3. 4. 2 Regression results / 44
3. 5 Additional tests / 50
3. 5. 1 Differing definitions of financial crisis periods / 50
3. 5. 2 Deletion of outliers / 53
3. 5. 3 Pre ̄crisis period results / 54
3. 6 Conclusions / 57
4. Long ̄term stock performance following top executive turnover: Evidence from China / 60
4. 1 Introduction / 60
4. 2 Hypotheses / 64
4. 3 Sample selection and data / 67
4. 3. 1 Sample selection / 67
4. 3. 2 Measure of turnover ̄related stock performance change / 71
4. 4 Empirical results / 73
4. 4. 1 Stock performance following CEO turnover / 73
4. 4. 2 Cross ̄sectional determinants of turnover ̄related change in stock performance / 77
4. 5 Conclusions / 81
5. Controlling shareholder, split ̄share structure reform and cash dividend payments in China / 83
5. 1 Introduction / 83
5. 2 Hypotheses / 86
5. 3 Sample selection and data / 89
5. 3. 1 Sample selection / 89
5. 3. 2 Variables / 90
5. 3. 3 Data description / 92
5. 4 Empirical results / 95
5. 5 Absolute levels of cash dividends, NPTS, and ownership concentration / 101 5. 6 Conclusion / 104
6. Conclusion and implications / 106
References / 109
Appendix / 133